Pragmatism
I'm a pragmatist in the John Dewey, Richard Rorty tradition. Many conflate pragmatism with an undisciplined relativism, a feel good anything goes attitude. They couldn't be more wrong. I found an excellent critique of pragmatism in The Philosopher's Toolkit by Julian Baggini and Peter S. Fosl. I think it will be useful in clearing up the confusion.
Pragmatist critique
On what basis should we accept or reject certain beliefs? Perhaps the most common answer one might receive to this question would be 'On the basis of whether the belief is true or not, of course.' But how are we best to unpack the meaning of 'true' here? Traditionally, many people have answered that true claims somehow express or mirror the nature of reality, and reality is what it is independent of whatever we think or say about it. The job of philosophy and science, from this point of view, is somehow to produce theories that picture or capture or reflect or represent that independent reality.
Pragmatists, however, think that there's something wrong with this way of conceiving truth, philosophy and science. According to the pragmatists, closer scrutiny will convince you that little sense can be made of what it means to 'mirror' or 'represent' or 'grasp' an independent reality. Moreover, in reflecting back on the history of philosophy, one can see that this sort of representationalist position produces more problems than it is worth.
A better option, say the pragmatists, is to think of true claims as those that we agree are more effective in helping us get along in the world; and we should give up entirely worrying about whether or not they represent an independent reality. Accordingly, the theories of natural science are true not because they express the nature of independent reality but because they enable us to manipulate objects in experiments and technologies in ways we approve. Moral theories are 'right' when they enable us to get along with one another and to act as we wish to. Aesthetic ideas need to be thought of as nothing more than agreements about what we ought to think of as beautiful (or, anyway, as artwork) and how we ought to arrange, feel and think about the sensible dimensions of our environments. In short, what we ought to adopt as true is what we agree solves problems for us and helps us get along better in the world.
We no longer need to concern ourselves with how things look to God, or from some imaginary and unobtainable, ideal point of view. We no longer need to worry about what lies beyond or below our experience and our engagements with the world. A lot of problems, say the pragmatists, can simply be left behind in this way. (Baggini, Fosl, p.191)
The Philosopher's Tookit
A Compendium of Philosophical Concepts and Methods
Julian Baggini
Peter S. Fosl
Comments
I think that Rorty and Dewey are very important thinkers. There isn't much that is simple-minded about them, indeed.
Two problems, though. However, Rorty is a somewhat unorthodox pragmatist. He calls himself a pragmatist more than mainstream pragmatists do. Of course this is not all bad; he is a powerful thinker and in many ways has gone beyond the ideas of Dewey, Pierce, Holmes, etc. The key difference as I see it is that Rorty is much more willing to be playful and manipulative (in a neutral sense) with moral concepts which many may understand in an old-fashioned, metaphysical way. So Rorty will openly deny that there is anything 'sacred' about human rights or American values, but say that we should still use these terms when and if they get us what we want. So his talk about "Achieving our Country" is at the very least deeply ironic, as is anything he says in favor of human rights. So while Rorty is a sophisticated thinker I still think he is more vunerable to some of the criticisms of relativism that pragmatism is generally.
Second problem: The attack on representationalism is a good turn in philosophy, away from a bad empiricist mistake. But I don't think that it is fair to call all non-reprsentationalist thought pragmatist, especially since there are and were good critiques of representationalism as well as 'metaphysical ethics' besides and before the pragmatists. For example Habermas has a defense of liberal democracy which is not metaphysical or representational but nevertheless defends the fundamental "truth-content" of free democractic principles. This is important because many of these other non-reprsentationalist schools would not go along with many pragmatist arguments.
Posted by: dende blogger | February 19, 2004 12:07 PM | Reply to this comment
Chris has addressed this issue in his discussion with you on his blog, and has covered many of the same points I would make. I don't have much to add, but found Rorty's response in a recent interview interesting. When asked to respond to the criticism that he is a postmodern relativist Rorty said, "Well, I'm not sure that any clear meaning has ever been given to the term 'postmodern relativism'. I think that if it means anything, it means that postmodern relativists don't believe that there is one true description of the way the world really is, and in that sense I am indeed a postmodern relativist. I suppose the reason that position is called relativism is that people who believe there's no such thing as the way the world is in itself think that all descriptions of everything are the product of attempts to gratify human needs and interests. Those needs and interests change, so our sense of what's important will, in many areas, keep changing. 'Relativism" doesn't strike me as the right word. Maybe 'fallibilist' would be better. I don't think the word 'postmodern' has any clear meaning, so I try to avoid it."
Posted by: Norm | February 21, 2004 12:28 AM | Reply to this comment